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I. INTRODUCTION

One determinant of market performance
is the ability of new firms to enter mar
kets. It is generally argued that the
fewer the restrictions on entry, ceteris
paribus, the more competitive a market
will tend to be.l1 Entry in the commercial
banking market is restricted on at least
two levels. One is that new entrants are
required to obtain charters from either
the Comptroller of the Currency or the
state banking authority. The other is
that the ability of a bank to branch is
constrained by the branching laws of the
state. Before one may recommend solu
tions to problems of performance in the
commercial banking industry, an analy
sis of the effect from these barriers to
entry on performance must be per
formed. Further than this, it is neces
sary to know if there exist different im
pacts from these two levels of entry bar
riers before specific solutions to policy
problems may be made.

This paper provides a test of the hy
pothesis that increased market entry
into the commercial banking industry,
ceteris paribus, will improve the per
formance of the industry. Performance
is measured as the size of the differen
. tial between interest rates charged on
loans between geographical areas, after
controlling for differences in growth,
borrower risk, and term to maturity
characteristics. Tests are also made to
determine whether or not it makes a
difference if entry is by new firms or by
new branches of existing firms. The re
sults of these tests provide us with im
plications for reform of the entry re
strictions on financial firms.
II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND THE
DATASET

Research on the competitive character
istics of banking markets generally esti
mate the effects of the number of firms
and deposit concentration ratios on
interest rates for loans. Kaufman (1966),
inte~est
Aspinwall (1970), and Davis and Ver
Aspmwall
brugge (1978) find the number of firms
to be a significant and negative deter
minant of interest rate differentials be
tween areas. Edwards (1%4), Aspinwall

(1970), and Davis and Verbrugge (1978)
conclude that concentration ratios are a
significant and positive determinant of
interest rate differentials between areas.
Rhoades (1980) concludes that new
entry by firms does not exert a signifi
cant impact upon the mobility and turn
over of the top five firms in 184 banking
markets.
Three problems associated with pre
vious research are addressed here.
First, entry is only addressed in
Rhoades (1980). All other studies re
gress the actual number of firms on
interest rates and not the change in the
number of firms over the previous
years. While Rhoades (1980) considers
the entry of firms as an independent
variable, the dependent variable of the
regression equation is not an interest
rate. Rather, mobility and turnover

1

(1965).
For example, see Bain 0%5).
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characteristics of firms are the depen
dent variables used as proxies for com
petition in the banking industry. The
present study uses an interest rate as the
dependent variable since it is clearly a
form of price competition, while mobil
ity and turnover are more the result of
competition rather than a type of com
petition. Possibly, the reason why
Rhoades (1980) does not find a signifi
cant relationship between entry and
competition is due to this specification
of competition.
A second problem is that markets are
defined as only one form of financial
firm. With the exception of Davis and
Verbrugge (1978), which considers sav
ings and loan associations, all the
studies restrict the market only to com
mercial banks. Since very few banks are
virtual monopolists in their geographical
areas, one need consider a wider defini
tion of a market that includes all kinds
of firms which are active participants.
Therefore, previous studies may have
misspecified their models of competition
in banking markets. This paper consid
ers the home mortgage market of 1975 in
39 Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (SMSAs).2 The choice of the 39
SMSAs is constrained by the unavail
ability of data on mutual savings banks
which made it necessary to consider only
those SMSAs without mutual savings
banks. In addition, SMSAs that are lo
cated in unit-banking states are not in
cluded in this sample because branching
is prohibited by law. The exclusion of
SMSAs with unit-banking laws allows
for comparison of only those areas
where entry is of two types: De novo
and branching. The use of this sample
allows for a test of a market where both
commercial banks and savings and loan
associations are participants, and it pro
vides for a clearer analysis of perfor
mance than previous studies which only
consider one kind of financial firm.

A third problem c.oncerns the defini
tion of the number of rivals: The' num
ber of main offices or the number of
branches. Aspinwall (970), Davis and
Verbrugge (978) and Rhoades (1980) use
the former measure based on the argu
ment that an increase in the number of
branches is a form of nonprice competi
tion. Longbrake and Peterson (1979) use
the number of different institutions in a
market, which includes market deposits
of branch offices of institutions head
quartered outside the market. It is ar
gued that branching does not serve to
increase price competition because all
the branches of a firm offer the same
prices. In this case, branching is viewed
as nonprice competition in the form of
convenience to customers and may end
up exerting a positive impact on prices
due to its being a cost of production. 3
Thus, the number of branches, ceteris
paribus, may exert a positive impact
upon prices.
While this argument appears reason
able, another possibility comes to mind.
Since branching adds to the sheer num
ber of competitors of rival firms,
branching may serve to lower interest
rates, ceteris paribus, as displayed in
the competitive market model of eco
nomics. Since the transaction between
the borrower and lender of mortgage
funds is usually a one-time transaction,
convenience in the form of branches has
little to do with mortgage interest rates.
Even if branching was for the conve
nience of customers, new banks which
decide not to branch could enter mar
kets where the existing firms did operate
branches and underprice their com
petitors. In this case, the long-run com
petitive situation would be characterized
by branching if it serves as a means of
decreasing production costs and interest
rates. This is the economies-of-scale ar
gument. Thus, the number of branches,
ceteris paribus, may exert a negative
impact upon prices. Since there are
conflicting ideas on the specification of
this variable, this issue becomes an em
pirical question.

Ill. MODELS AND TESTS

The following reduced-form equation of
interest rate determination is estimated.44
= r(P, LV, TM, MS, Ei )
R =
0)
where
= effective interest rate on home
R =
mortgages
= percentage change in population
P =
from 1974 to 1975
= loan-to-value ratio
LV =
= term to maturity
TM =
= firms per population at begin
MS =
ning of the period of analysis
Ei = entry variables
= percentage change in the num
E1 =
ber of main offices of commer
cial banks and savings and loan
associations for various years
~ =
= percentage change in the num
ber of branches of commercial
banks and savings and loan as
sociations for various years.

The data set is from Federal Home' Loan Bank
Board (1979). This set consists of a survey of all
qualifying loans in 1975 for single-family, non
farm, conventional mortgages closed during the
frrst five working days of the month. The sample
used here includes commercial banks, savings and
loan associations, and mortgage bankers, and the
data are calculated as annual averages for all re
ported loans by SMSA.
3 It could also be argued that there exist certain
economies of scale which result from branching
and serve to lower interest rates. Gilbert and
Longbrake (1974) present a detailed evaluation of
the effects of branching on the productive effi
ciency of financial institutions. Evidence is pre
sented for the conclusion that organizational
structure does influence the cost of producing
various services but that no one form of structure
is superior overall. For example, in the case of
real estate loans, the above study finds that there
exist lower costs in branch offices versus produc
tion in the main office. On the other hand, Long
brake and Peterson (1979) find that market struc
ture and organizational structure variables do not
exert significant impacts upon regional mortgage
rate differentials. While this issue of economies of
scale in banking is unsettled in the literature, it is
argued here that the sample is restricted to only
non-un it-banking areas and that frrms enjoy simi
lar economies of scale. In other words, this econ
omies of scale issue would be more relevant if the
data consisted of SMSAs with both branching and
nonbranching laws.
44 Number of commercial banks and savings and
loan associations are obtained from Summary of
Accounts and Deposits (1968-1975) and Summary
of Savings Accounts by Geographical Area
0968-1975),
(1968-1975), respectively. Population data are
from Statistical Abstract of the United States
0974
(1974 and 1975). All other data are from tl:te Fed
eral Home Loan Bank Board (1979).
2
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Figure 1. Regression Estimates of the Mortgage Interest Rate Equation.
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The dependent variable R is calcu
lated as an effective rate using the Fed
eral Home Loan Bank Board's proce
dure of amortizing initial fees and
charges over a to-year
lO-year period. The vari
able P is used to measure the impact of
population growth on mortgage interest
rates. This is a proxy for specifying
certain characteristics of the demand for
housing. It is expected that, with all else
remaining the same, there exists a posi
tive relationship between population
growth and mortgage interest rates.
Interest rates vary with the type, matu
rity and risk characteristics of loans.
Therefore, part of the variation in re
gional interest rates may result from
differences in the economic characteris
tics of loans rather than from differences
in housing demand or market structure.
Two variables are selected to control for
mortgage lending risk: Loan-to-value
and term-to-maturity variables.

Since the loan-to-value ratio is a mea
sure of risk to firms, higher levels of
L V, ceteris paribus, are expected to af
af
fect mortgage rates positively. This re
lationship has been shown in Schaaf
(1977). The expected
(1966) and Ostas (977).
sign of the term-to-maturity variable is
uncertain. On the one hand, the longer
the term, the slower that mortgage own
ers earn equity, and therefore the higher
the risk for mortgage lenders. On the
other hand, the longer the term, the
lower the risk for mortgage lenders
since this produces lower monthly pay
ments. Since there exists no a priori
reasoning to choose one explanation
over the other, the expected sign is am~
am:"
biguous. The empirical evidence on the
sign of TMis mixed. For example, Jack
son and Kaserman (1980) find a positive
relationship between default risk on
home mortgages and term-to-maturity
While
while Barth, Cordes and Yezer (1979)
find a negative relationship.
The model is incomplete without in
cluding some form of market structure
variable that reflects the monopoly
power of existing institutions and which
would, in tum, influence the ability of
new entrants to affect prices. Market
structure could itself change as new
banks entered the market or as growth

rates differed among different-sized in
stitutions already in the market. There
fore, a market structure variable at the
beginning of the period of analysis may
be most appropriate. The number of
commercial banks and savings and loan
associations per population at the be
ginning of the period of analysis is cho
sen to measure market structure. 5
Higher levels of MS should be nega
tively related to mortgage rates. The
entry variable £1 is expected to exert
negative impacts upon mortgage interest
rates, while the expected sign of £2 re
mains an empirical question. The time
periods 1968-1975, 1970-1975 and 1972
1975 are used to measure the rate of
entry.
Figure 1 displays the ordinary least
squares estimates for the reduced-form
_. equation in (I).
(1). The population growth
variable P always exerts a positive im
•5 The variable MS was also specified as the number
of offices of firms per population. Since the results
of the analysis did not change,
change. only those equa
tions estimated with the numbers of firms are
shown.
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signifipact upon mortgage rates and is signifi
loan-tocantly different from zero. The loan-to
negavalue variable LV always exerts a nega
tive impact upon mortgage rates but is
not significantly different from zero.
The coefficients on the term-to-maturity
variable TM are always positive and
significantly different from zero.
strucThe coefficients on the market struc
ture variable MS are always negative
but never significantly different from
zero. This suggests that the market
structure that existed at the beginning
period of analysis is not an important
determinant of interest rate differentials.
While this result is unexpected, it
should be noted that the MS variable is
included in the equation to control for
the ability of new entrants to affect
interest rates. 6
The entry variable E1 and branching
variable &. always exert a negative and
statistically significant impact upon
mortgage rates. These results suggest
that, at least since 1968, entry exerts a
competitive effect on mortgage interest
rates. Since increased branching also rere
sults in lower interest rates, this may be
evidence of economies of scale in
banking. However, since E 2 may also
•8 Longbrake and Peterson (1979) fmd that existing
~ket
market structure is not sillllificant
significant in explaining
regIOnal
regional mortgage rate dilferentials
differentials and suggest
that improvement in secondary markets be a polpol
icy objective.

instituinclude de novo branch entry of institu
tions outside the market, the pure scale
be blurred.
economy impact may be
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